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In the early sixteenth century Aruc and fiayru'd-Din 
Barbarossa established themselves as successful pirate 
captains in the western Mediterranean Sea. Aruc, the leader 
of their enterprises until his death in 1518, became aware of 
the political vacuum which existed in the Magrib and as a 
result worked to establish a personal kingdom. In 1517, he 
was invited to Algiers to drive out the Spanish and was 
killed fighting to maintain his position there. fiayru'd-Din 
then assumed control of Algiers and brought that city and 
all the territory he subsequently conquered into the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Barbarossa was unable to consolidate his position in 
North Africa and he withdrew to Cicelli because of the 
opposition of Spain and the rebellious tribes in the area 
around Algiers. By 1$25 fiayru 1 d-D1n was in a position to 
return to Algiers and fight successfully against his Spanish 
adversaries. In a series of military engagements the corsair 
reduced the Spanish Empire in North Africa to one enclave, 
Oran, and defeated the Spanish fleet. The Ottoman Sultan, 
Suleyman I, took notice of these accomplishments and made 
Barbarossa ~aptan Pa9a {admiral) of the Turkish fleet. With 
Hayru'd-DTn as admiral, the Ottoman navy dominated the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
Following Hayru'd-Din's death in 1546, control of 
Algiers passed quickly from the Barbarossa family to the 
Janissaries stationed in the Pa~alik (province). While the 
province continued to recognize the Turkish Sultan as 
suzerain, political control remained in the hands of the 
Janissaries until the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. 
The fiction of direct Ottoman control was eventually 
abandoned when in 1710 the · Sultan issued a firman (decree) 
that vested executive authority in a Dey elected by the 
Turkish soldiers stationed in Algeria. 
Despite the dominant role played by the Janissaries 
in Algeria, their economic dependence on the activities of 
the Ia'ifa ul-Ru'asa (corporation of corsair captains) 
forced them to share some political power with that body. 
The Ta' ifa ul-Ru' asa was ultimately responsible' for the 
institution of the Deylik in 1671 when the army failed to 
keep order in the Pa9alik. 
The country did not suffer greatly from the political 
changes that occurred throughout this period, since the 
administration of the state remained in the hands of a 
bureaucracy which competently carried out the duties of 
government and maintained law and order. Indeed, though 
over half of the thirty elected Deys were assassinated, 
Algeria still functioned as a solvent, effective and 
generally well-ordered state. Eventually, however, the 
Pa~alik's preoccupation with piracy and the designs of an 
Empire-conscious French minister l ed Ottoman Algeria to the 
fatal conflict with France and to ultimate extinction. 
"The region which later became known as Algeria 
presents a framework not readily acceptable to the 
historian of Muslim North Africa. The frontiers 
which are shown on the map cannot set bounds to 
his field of study; they only assume any signif-
icance with the establishment of the Turkish 
regency of Algiers in the course of the sixteenth 
century." 
George Mar9ais, "Algeria," Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al. (London: Luzac 
& Company, 1960), I, 366. 
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PREFACE 
This study of the ruling institutions and the ruling 
hierarchy of Algiers from 1517-1830 is based on French, 
English and American travellers' accounts and secondary 
sources. Although British and American documents were 
examined, they revealed very little pertinent information. 
Because of the limitations posed by the nature of these 
sources, many of the conclusions drawn herein are tenta-
tive, pending examination of the Arabic and Turkish archival 
materials at a later date. 
Spelling of Arabic and Turkish names and admin-
istrative terms conforms to the system used by H. A. R. Gibb 
and Harold Bowen in Islamic Society and the West, 2 parts, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1950, 1957. Because 
Algiers adopted a lingua franca which combined words from 
various Romance languages, terms like Mezouard and 
armadores are spelled in this text as they were found in 
the sources. 
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ARUC AND fiAYRU'D-DIN BRING ALGERIA INTO 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
Mytilene, capital of the island of Lesbos, was a 
bustling harbor which served both as a center for ship 
building and a refuge for Aegean pirates. Aruc and Hayru'd-Din 
Barbarossa1 served their apprenticeship in this environment 
during the last quarter of the fifteenth century. There has 
been some historical controversy over the ethnic origins of 
the Barbarossas. Contemporary Christian writers maintained 
that they were Greeks whose ancestors had been converted to 
Islam when the Ottomans conquered the island. A more plausible 
version is that Aruc and Hayru'd-Din 1 s father, Ya~ub, was a 
Sipahi (Turkish cavalryman), who served in Mytilene after 
tesbos fell to Mu.l}.ammad al-fatih. 2 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the two 
brothers, under Aructs leadership were successful pirates in 
the Aegean Sea where they quickly came into conflict with the 
Ottoman navy. Thereupon they decided to move their operations 
1Aruc and Hayru'd-Din became known in the west by the 
surname Barbarossa, given originally to Aruc because of his 
flaming red beard. Aruc was the older of the two. 
2This controversy is discussed in Stanley Lane-Poole, 
The Barbary Corsairs (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1890), p. 31. 
See also R. Tourneau, ttcArudj,_ 11 Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(London: Luzac, 1960), I, o7~. 
1 
2 
to the western Mediterranean. 3 After spending s_ome time 
looking for a secure base, Aruc and fiayru 1 d-D1n made an agree-
ment in 1504 with cAbd M~ammad b. al-ijasan (1494-1526), the 
Hafsid ruler of Tunis. In return for a fifth of their booty, 
al-ijasan granted the Barbarossas the use of the Halk al-Vad 
fortress near Tunis harbor, and guaranteed them his protection 
should they need it.4 
The Barbarossas realized immediate success in their 
new surroundings because they were outstanding seamen who put 
the element of surprise to good use. Their initial voyages 
were so profitable that Aruc•s fleet increased from two to 
eight ships.5 This additional strength made the Barbarossas 
loom as a potential threat to al-ijasan's position in Tunis. 
The Hafsid ruler felt that putting distance between Tunis and 
his erstwhile allies would remove this threat. In 1510, 
al-ijasan was able to get the Barbarossas out of the~ 
al-Vad by making Aruc ka•id (ruler) of the nearby island of 
Cerba.6 
When Aruc and Hayru•d-Din had first come to the central 
Magrib (Ma~rib al-Awsat), they were chiefly concerned with 
making money as pirates. But gradually they became awar~ of 
3Lane-Poole, p. 32. 
4Hacci fialifa, The Histor of the Maritime Wars of the 
Turks, trans. James Mitchell London: Oriental Translation 
Fund, 1831), p. 29. See also Lane-Poole, p. 35, and Tourneau. 
5Lane-Poole, p. 39. 
6Tourneau. 
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the political anarchy which gripped the North African coastal 
area. It therefore became apparent to them that an enter-
prising man, capable of gathering the requisite military 
strength, could carve out a personal kingdom in the Magrib. 
Once he became aware of this political situation, Aruc spent 
all of his time and energy creating a kingdom for himself, 
while gayru'd-Din took charge of his brother's pirate 
interests. The elder brother first wanted to gain control of 
one of the coastal town with a good harbor. This would serve 
both as a base from which Aruc could expand his political 
domain and a center for corsair activities. 
Barbarossa's first opportunity came when the former 
Hafsid ruler of Bicaya (Bougie), asked Aruc in 1512 for 
assistance in retaking his town from the Spanish.7 The elder 
Barbarossa agreed in the hope that he would be able to assume 
complete control of the town once the Spanish had been driven 
out. After failing in two attempts against Bicaya, Aruc 
returned to Gerba to reconsider his military position.8 Once 
there, the corsair decided to bypass Bicaya temporarily and 
attack a more vulnerable town. With this in mind, the corsair 
leader conquered Cicelli (Shershell).~ Now that he was estab-
lished on the Magribi coast, Aruc worked to gain the strength 
necessary to drive the Spanish out of Bicaya. He consolidated 
his position at Cioelli by giving grain to the -rebellious 
7rbid. -8Lane-Poole, p. 40. 
9Hacci galifa, p. 30. 
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tribes in the area during a famine. 10 With the support of 
these tribes, Barbarossa then marched a third time against 
Bicaya and succeeded in taking the town. Now that he was 
firmly established in two Magribi towns, Barbarossa felt 
secure enough to break completely with the Hafsids in Tunis. 
The great success of the Barbarossas attracted to 
their cause lesser known pirate captains (Ru•asa, sing. Re 1 is), 
including Kurd Ogli and Mussallh al-Din Re•is, who flocked · 
with their ships to join the brothers. 11 Aruc and J!ayru•d-DTn, 
at the head of a twenty-eight ship fleet and with secure 
bases at Bicaya and Cicelli, were now in a position to 
challenge Spanish power further to the west at Algiers and 
Tlemsen. 
At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Algiers 
was within the dominion of the ruler of Tlemsen but had after 
many years transferred its allegiance to the King of Cicelli, 
a city closer and better equipped to assist Algiers if the 
need arose. At this time, the people of Algiers began to 
sail the Mediterranean Sea as pirates, attacking the southern 
coast of Spain as well as most western Mediterranean islands.12 
This activity was intensified after 1492, when many Moriscos 
(Spanish Muslims) settled in Algiers to escape the religious 
persecution of the Christian ruler. They soon engaged 1n 
lOTourneau. 
11Hacci fialifa, p. 31. 
12samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His 
Pilgrimes (20 vols; Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), 
VI, 116. 
piratical activities, and burning for revenge against the 
Spanish, they connived with the Moriscos still remaining in 
Spain to plunder the villages on the Andalusian coast.13 
5 
The combined efforts of the Algerian pirates and the 
resourceful Moriscos threatened Spain's position in the 
Mediterranean world. To check the activities of these 
Algerian pests, King Ferdinand sent a joint land and naval 
force to construct a fortress in the harbor opposite the city, 
the Penon d'Alger. From this position, the Spanish could now 
control all sea traffic moving in and out of the city and 
thereby undermine Algiers' economic existence. Consequently, 
the inhabitants had no alternative but to submit to Spanish 
control. uThe unfortunate Algerin8s were • • • obliged to 
submit to them ,Lt'he Spanish? and pay tribute • 1114 • • 
King Ferdinand's death in 1516 cast the administration 
of Spain's North African dominions into a temporary state of 
confusion. Salim al-Tu.mi, ~eyh of Algiers, immediately took 
the initiative and sent a letter to Aruc Barbarossa at 
Cicelli in which he asked the corsair for assistance against 
Spain.15 The opportunity the elder Barbarossa had long 
awaited now arrived. If he could 8stablish himself at 
Algiers he would be in an excellent position to carve out a 
sizeable kingdom. Leaving Hayru 1 d•D1n in charge of Cicelli, 
13Roger B. Merriman, Suleiman the Ma,nifice~t 
{Cambridge: Harvard University Presa, 191i.4, pp.06-7. 
14Hacci fialifa. 
15Lane-Poole, p. 46; Tourneau; Hacci ~alifa. 
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Aruc marched to Algiers and quickly occupied the city. Once 
there, Barbarossa used his army to seize the government of 
Algiers from the ruling tribesmen. The quarrelsome ~eduin 
were too weak and disorganized to resist so Aruc quickly 
✓ - -staged a coup d 1 etat and murdered al-Twni. He then let it 
be known that he had no intention of compromising his position 
in the city by risking an attack on the Penon d 1 Alger. The 
fortress was too small to threaten Algiers militarily, 
despite its continuous bombardment of Algerian shipping. 
But the Penon was strong enough to resist any army Aruc had 
at his disposal. If he had attacked in 1517, the corsair 
would had sapped his small army's strength and it would have 
been unable to defend Algiers successfully against the force 
the Spanish had sent from Tlemsen to drive Barbarossa out 
of the city.16 
With the Spanish threat temporarily removed Aruc 
turned to the problems of organizing his enlarged kingdom. 
When Barbarossa had assumed control of Algiers, the number of 
problems involved in the consolidation of his position in 
North Africa had increased. The only possible threat to his 
occupation of Bicaya and Cicelli came from the recalcitrant 
Arab and Berber tribes who generally opposed all forms of 
government. These had been easily subdued. At Algiers, on 
the other hand, in addition to dealing with the rebellious 
tribes 1n the immediate area, Aruc was confronted by the 
16Tourneau. 
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forces of the Spanish. They were well entrenched in western 
Ma~rib al-Awsat. Aside from their strategic position in the 
Peno~ d'Alger, they ruled Tlemsen and Oran. If Aruc Barbarossa 
wanted to maintain his kingdom he would have to terminate 
effective Spanish power in North Africa. But before Aruc 
attempted to deal with the Spanish, he subordinated the 
Thelebis, the tribe which dominated the area· surrounding 
Algiers. 17 
Having accomplished this, Barbarossa gradually spread 
his influence along the coast by adding Meliana and Tinnis 
to his kingdom. With most of the central Magribi coast now 
under his rule, Aruc sent for Hayru 1d-Din who had remained 
at Cicelli with a reserve force. The elder brother then 
divided his kingdom. He gave Hayru'd-Din the area east of 
Algiers with its center at Dellys, and kept the western half, 
including Algiers, for himself. 18 
Aruc now felt that his position in North Africa was 
secure enough to risk a frontal attack on Spain's Magribi 
possessions. This too.k the form of an attack on Tlemsen, 
whose ruler, Abu Zaiyan, 19 paid tribute to Spain. Tlemsen 
and its port Oran, the latter under direct Spanish control, 
were historically the launching points for Spanish penetration 
17J. Leo Africanus, The History_and Descr_!Qtion of 
Africa, trans. John Pory, ed. Robert Brown(3 vols.; London: 
Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1896), I, 149-50. 
18Tourneau. 
19 Leo Africanus, II, 660. 
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into the Magrib. They were, in addition, the supply centers 
for the Penon d'Alger. Barbarossa marched with the backing 
of the local Arab and Berber tribes and succeeded in taking 
Tlemsen in 1518. Later the same year, Aruc was defeated by 
the troops sent against him by the Marquis of Comares, 
Governor of Oran. In an abortive attempt . to reach Algiers, 
Barbarossa was captured and killed by a pursuing Spanish 
force. 2O 
Aruc failed because he over-extended himself before 
thoroughly consolidating his position at Algiers by removing 
the Spanish from the Penon d'Alger and completely subordi-
nating the tribes of the interior to his rule. He also 
lacked the military strength to attack Spain's most formidable 
African enclave successfully. 21 Despite his defeat under the 
walls of Tlemsen, the corsair nevertheless made some contri-
butions to the ultimate unification of Magrib al-Awsat under 
the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. By welding together 
the Morisco and Turkish corsairs he created a naval force 
that eventually identified with the Empire and significantly 
influenced Algerian history for three centuries. Aruc also 
succeeded in subordinating several towns to one government 
when they had formerly been in the hands of feuding, disunited 
Beduins. Despite his failures, Barbarossa's accomplishments 




built a united · and well organized state. 
!!ayru 1 d-Din had played only a subordinate role in his 
brother's political maneuvers, largely confining his activi-
ties to leading pirate raids against the southern coast of 
Europe. He had observed the obstacles encountered by his 
brother in his attempt to establish a personal state in North 
Africa. Aruc•s difficulties made Hayru 1 d•D!n realize that he 
needed outside support to keep Algiers under his control. As 
a result, he decided that it would be to his best advantage 
to ally with the Ottoman Empire. It is the opinion of Hacci 
Halifa that !!,ayru1 d-Din contacted the Ottoman Sultan in 1517, 
when he was at Cicelli. uAbout this time Sultan Selim having 
conquered Egypt, Kurd Oghli went to meet him with magnificent 
presents ••• 1122 Other accounts relate only that Barbarossa 
sent emissaries to pay homage to the Porte after Aruc 1 s death 
when he realized that outside help would be necessary if he 
were to remain at Algiers. 23 
Algiers became a tributary of the Ottoman Empire. in 
1518, and until 1830 the Ottoman Sultan's name was given in 
the Hutba {bidding prayer), and all Algerian coins were struck 
in his name. Barbarossa was named beylerbeyi {governor) of 
22Hacci Halifa, p. 32. This version has only been 
accepted by Elizabeth Stone /sutherland Menzie.!!7, Turkey Old 
and New (2 vols; London: 18~0), I, 205. 
23H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islam c Societ and 
the West (2 parts; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19 O, 
1957), I, 92. See also Merriman, p. 208; and Lane-Poole, 
p. 54. Aaother version is that Selim I asked Aruc and 
!;!ayru•d-Din to drive the Spanish out of Algiers. Robert L. 
Playfair, The Scourge of Christendom (London: Smith, Elder, 
1884), p. 3. 
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the province (Beylerbeyilik or Pa,alik) 24 in return for 
bringing Algiers into the Empire. Along with this he 
received a force of two thousand Janissaries (Ottoman 
infantry) to help him govern. 25 The Su.ltan gave Jiayru'd-Din 
two additional privileges. First, he was permitted to recruit 
four thousand Turkish volunteers who would be in his personal 
service; secondly, he was allowed to maintain military 
recruiting agents at Istanbul and Izmir who would send 
replacements for deceased Janissaries. 26 
The Ottomans recognized the advantage of acquiring a 
province in North Africa. Egypt would be partially protected 
on its western flank. But even more important to Turkish strat-
egy was Hayru'd-Din Barbarossa who himself possessed great 
naval power and was master of the western Mediterranean. 27 
He was probably the most capable sea captain of his era and 
was supported by many of the most able seamen of the period. 
Selim I had built a large navy, but it lacked the necessary 
leadership to fight effectively against the combined navies 
of Charles V allied with some Italian states, or to compete 
24Algiers was ruled by a beylerbeyi from 1518 to 1587, 
and from 1587 to 1830 by a Pa~a. For uniformity the term 
Pa1alik is used throughout.-
25Merriman. Plantet agrees that two thousand troops 
were sent, but claims that this occurred during the reign of 
Suleyman. E. Plantet, Les Correspondance des Days D'Al~er 
avec la cour de France (2 vols.; Paris: Felix Alcan, l 89), 
I, xv. 
26Plantet, p. xvi; Merriman. 
27Lane-Poole, p. 56. This view has been accepted by 
most writers on the subject. 
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with Venice in the Aegean Sea. Barbarossa's position in the 
western Mediterranean, his personal abilities, and the excel-
lent qualities of his subordinates, made his navy a welcome 
addition to Ottoman sea power. 
Before Hayru•d-Din could take an active role in the 
Ottoman navy, he had first to deal with the pressing problems 
confronting him 1n North Africa. Many of the areas that had 
succumbed to Aruc now rose in revolt, while Spain, refusing 
to be reconciled 'to the establishment of an alien state in 
the Magrib, encouraged the Beg (ruler) of Tlemsen to attack 
Khayr al-Din. Barbarossa crushed the Beg when the latter led 
a combined force of Moors and Spaniards against Algiers. The 
corsair immediately took advantage of this situation by organ-
izing an expedition against Spanish-controlled Tlemsen. One 
of the corsair's prisoners, ijasan, the Ser Asker (military 
leader) of Tlemsen, agreed to attempt the seizure of that 
city to add to Barbarossa's kingdom 1n return for a share of 
the spoils of battle. fiayru 1 d-Din agreed, sending ijasan with 
loyal Turkish troops to attack Tlemsen and drive out its pro-
Spanish leaders. When the Ser Asker arrived at the town he 
discovered that the city had already revolted against th~ 
Spanish and driven them out of the city. 28 Shortly thereafter, 
Hayru•d-Din added Tlemsen to his kingdom. 
Tlemsen was far from Algiers, however . Hayru 1 d-D1n•s 
v success there had little effect on his position in the Magrib. 
28Hacci galifa, p. 34. 
12 
In fact, the towns of Cicelli and Tinnis had taken advantage 
of Barbarossa's preoccupation with Tlemsen to rebel against 
the central authority, while Ibn al-Kadi, ruler of Kuko, had 
deserted him. These events made the corsair's position 
extremely critical. With most of his kingdom in a state of 
rebellion and the Spanish in control of Algiers' harbor, 
Hayru'd-Din felt that it was unsafe for him to remain in the 
city. 
As a result, Barbarossa went to Cicelli in 1520, 
regained political control over the rebels, and used the port 
as a base from which to continue his pirate activities. 29 
At the same time he worked to regain the rest of his kingdom 
by carefully consolidating his position, gradually building 
up his military strength and taking the coastal towns of Kol, 
Bona and Konstantine.30 During the five years Hayru'd-Din 
spent at Cicelli, he worked fro the time when he could estab-
lish himself permanently at Algiers. He neutralized the 
position of the King of Kuko by allying with the Kabyl Chief, 
cAbd ul-CAziz, Ibn Kadi's chief rival. This alliance allowed 
the corsair to re-enter Algiers in 1525. 
The beylerbey1 then took immediate steps to increase 
the size of his army. He used the recruiting powers granted 
him by the Porte in 1518 and enlisted a personal bodyguard 
Yver, "Khair al-Din (Barbarossa),"~-
~~~-===-~~~~a:!:!m, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, et al. (4 vols.; 
Brill, 1913-36), II, 871. 
30Lane-Poole, p. 55. 
of five hundred Spanish renegades and an army of seven to 
eight thousand Greeks, Albanians, and Kabyles whom he 
separated from the regular Janissary force by placing the 
new recruits under the command of the Ru 1 asa.31 
13 
Hayru'd-Din now completed the consolidation of his 
position in the city of Algiers by successfully storming and 
taking the Penon d'Alger 1n 1529. This had been an essential 
move for the beylerbeyi, for the fortress had controlled the 
harbor and neutralized Barbarossa's position in Algiers.32 
This was naturally a serious blow to the Spanish Empire, 
for it meant that Oran was Spain's only remaining possession 
in Magrib al-Awsat. An even more crushing blow to Spanish 
prestige came 1n October of 1529 when Caccia Diabolo Re 1 is 
defeated the Spanish navy off the island of Formentera.33 
Both the Mediterranean world and the local population were 
awed by these two significant victories and fiayru 1 d-Din 1 s 
position became greatly strengthened. "The Arabs now attached 
themselves to him • • • u34 and 11 • • • all Mohammedan pirates 
in the western Mediterranean, most of them European renegades, 
flocked to serve under his orders ••• tt35 
31Yver, 872. 
32Roger B. Merriman, The Rise ·or the Spanish Empire 
in the Old World a~d the New {4 vols; New York: The 
MacMillan Co., 193 ), III, 295. 
33Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent, p. 209. 
34Hacci lialifa, p. 39. 
35Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent. 
14 
Most of the towns in Ma~rib al-Awsat recognized 
Hayru•d-Din as their ruler and paid a yearly tax to their 
sovereign. Cicelli paid three thousand ducats per year in 
tribute.36 Even Tlemsen, where Abdullah, its ruler had 
responded to Spanish pressure to reject Ottoman suzerainty 
by having his name read in the fiu~ba, was finally subdued 
and forced to pay an indemnity of twenty thousand ducats plus 
a yearly tribute of ten thousand.37 Barbarossa also succeeded 
in subordinating the tribes of the interior to the government 
in Algiers. They were organized into federations loosely 
tied to the central administration. By this device, fiayru•d-
Din succeeded in ending the factional strife which formerly 
dominated the area outside the city.38 
It had taken the beylerbeyi twelve years, but he had 
systematically secured his position at Algiers. At the sam~ 
time he had increased his navy with which he had both fought 
against the Porte's enemies and continued his piratical 
activities. Barbarossa's demonstration of astute political 
leadership in the subjugation of the central Magrib and his 
success as a pirate made a deep impression on Istanbul. The 
Turkish navy was ineffective when it sailed out of the Aegean, 
and the Sultan recognized that the Ottoman navy could become 
a formidable power only if directly joined with fiayru'd-Din•s 




fleet. Indeed, Suleyman clearly saw the advantages of combi-
nation. He knew that B.arbarossa could teach the Empire 1 s 
navigators and shipbuilders much they should know. As a 
result, Grand Vizir Ibrahim strenuously urged closer relations 
between the Turkish naval forces in the eastern and western 
Mediterranean.39 
In 1533, an imperial messenger arrived at Algiers 
bearing Suleyman 1 s command for fiayru 1 d-D1n to present himself 
before the Porte in Istanbul. The beylerbeyi responded 
slowly, for he feared that if he appeared eager, it would 
cheapen his worth in the Sultan•s eyes. Finally in August, 
1533, after naming ijasan Aga {Kallya Aga of Barbarossa 1 s 
troops) his viceroy (fia1Ifa),40 Barbarossa sailed for the 
capitai.41 He was well received by both the Sultan and the 
Grand Vizir and the latter proclaimed ~ayru•d-Din ~aptan Pa~a 
(admiral) of the Ottoman navy. Instead of being granted the 
Sancak of Gallipoli as was customary for holders of this 
office, Barbarossa obtained a far more important assignment. 
The nineteenth Vilayet of the Empire was placed under his 
control as well as thirteen Sancaks. He also received an 
• 
annual income of 885,000 af9es. In recognition of Barbarossa•s 
outstanding abilities as a statesman and a sea captain, he 
was also made a member of the Imperial Divan with a position 
39tane-Poole, pp. 74-75. 
40yver. 
41Lane-Poole, p. 81. 
equal to the Ser Asker, a rank just below the Grand Vizir 
and the §eyhu'l-Islam (head of the Ottoman religious insti-
tution) .42 
16 
Ottoman history from the fall of 1533, until Hayru•d-
DTn•s death in 1546 is full of accounts of Suleyman•s land 
campaigns and the Kaptan Pasa•s exploits at sea. During this 
• 
period the admiral returned to Algiers only for logistical 
purposes. The city's government had in fact passed into the 
hands of ijasan Aga, although Barbarossa maintained the title 
beylerbeyi until his death when he was succeeded by his son 
Hasan • • 
,!!ayru•d-Din Barbarossa was of great importance to the 
Ottoman Empire. From 1533 to 1546, the Turkish fleet under 
his command controlled the Mediterranean Sea. This was 
recognized in 1538 when the taptan Pa~a defeated the renowned 
Genoese Admiral, Andrea Doria, and the Spanish fleet at 
Prevesa off the Albanian coast. Even after [ayru•d-Din 1 s 
death, the corsair tradition continued in the Ottoman fleet. 
His lieutenants, Kurd Ogli, Torgud, Ochialy, Sinan Pa9a, and 
Salah Re•is, all former pirates, made the Sultan's navy the 
most efficiently led in the Mediterranean world. This 
Ottoman mastery of the Mediterranean lasted until 1571, when 
the Ottoman fleet, under ~aptan Pa9a Ochialy, was defeated 
at Lepanto. 
Barbarossa's great ability, however, led indirectly 
42Gibb and Bowen, 94-95. 
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to the decline of the Turkish navy. When he was named 
~aptan Pa§a, he was also given the rank of Vizir because of 
his ability as a political leader. After fiayru'd-Din's 
death, the Porte continued to combine the Divan position 
with the office of ~aptan Pa~a. Because of the structure 
of the Ottoman ruling institution, one of the ~api ~ul 
(slaves trained for administrative positions in the palace 
school), was usually made ~aptan Pa~a, although there were 
few ~api ~ulus with naval experience.43 As a result able 
naval leaders were ignored by the Porte. This development, 
the loss of thousands of trained sailors at Lepanto, and the 
gradual decline in the quality of the corsair Ru'asa, led 
to the eventual collapse of Ottoman sea power. 
43~., pp. 95-96. 
CHAPTER II 
TID!; EVOLUTION OF ALGERIAN-OTTOMAN RELATIONS 
The Janissary Corps emerged as the political power in 
Algiers as early as 1556, however, it was not until 1689 that 
the Ocak (military contingent in Algiers) was firmly estab-
lished as the ruling hierarchy. 1 Throughout the Ottoman period 
in Algerian history, military influence in the government 
changed frequently, and each of these changes lessened the 
tie between Algiers and the Porte. Despite the degree of 
local autonomy achieved by the Pasalik there was no signif-
icant change in the structure of the province's local govern-
ment. Whether Pa§a, ~ or Dey ruled, the administrative 
organization remained unaltered. The only significant 
political change was in the amount of influence exerted on 
the government by the Turkish soldiers. 
In the seventeenth century, Ottoman rule broke down 
throughout the Middle East. After the Battle of Lepanto, 
1571, the Osmanlis lost the ability to regulate their peri-
pheral provinces. In Egypt, Mamluke Emirs assumed control 
of the political administration, and more significantly took 
possession of the Mukata•at (a form of land holding). They 
were able to use the land taxes derived from thes~ estates 
1The Janissaries and the Ta 1 ifa ul-Ru 1 asa will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
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for personal enrichment much as the Janissaries and Ru'asa in 
Algiers used the revenues of that province. 2 During the 
middle of the same century in Tunis, hereditary Beys, elected 
by the Janissaries, usurped Ottoman power.3 What occurred in 
Egypt and Tunis reflected earlier events in Algiers. In all 
three Pasaliks, the absence of strong Ottoman government gave 
rise to power struggles among indigenous groups that rejected 
Istanbul's authority. Although the provinces copied Turkish 
administrative institutions, they developed them independently, 
adapting local government to meet local needs. A military 
government evolved in Algiers because there was no other 
group, internal or external, capable of assuming control of 
the province . 
The evidence does not indicate that the Ottoman Empire 
limited the growing political power of the Janissaries in 
Algiers, and it is unlikely that the Sultan was ever capable 
of enforcing his will in the distant Pa~alik. The Algerians, 
however, never completely severed their connections with the 
Ottoman Empire. Through an evolutionary process, the province 
became completely independent of the Porte's political influ-
ence while copying ottoman institutions and identifying with 
the Empire. This was only natural. First, the ruling 
2stanford J. Shaw, The Fi a cial and 
Or anization and Develo ment of Ottoman E t 1 1 -1 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 1-12. 
3Thomas MacGill, An Acco t of Tu s Its Government 
fil.£_. (Glasgow: J. Hedderwick, 1 11, pp. 1- • 
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hierarchy in Algiers was composed of Turkish soldiers; second, 
the Algerians were Muslims and recognized the Turkish Sultan-
Caliph; and third, there were many diplomatic advantages to 
be gained from claiming allegiance to the Sultan. Because of 
these ties Algeria remained nominally an Ottoman province 
from 1518 until the French conquest of 1830. Yet the consti-
tutional relationship between the Empire and province changed 
frequently during the Ottoman period. To understand Algerian 
government during this period it is important to examine 
these changes. 
Suleyman and his Grand Vizir Ibrahim did not attempt 
to establish close ties between Algiers and Istanbul. The 
Sultan recognized that this distant province could not be 
directly controlled. In fac~, the ties between the Ottoman 
Empire and Algiers were so loose that the Porte gave Hayru 1d-
Din and his successors direct control over all regions they 
could conquer and govern.4 This arrangement was similar to 
the ones established with the Hanate of the Crimea and the 
Serifate of Mecca. , 
The Algerians were never seriously obligated to the 
Porte. The tribute, set at 500,000 dollars every three years, 
was to be paid only in times of ttprosperity. 11 At first, 
Algiers paid the money knowing that naval stores, a ship, and 
general military supplies would be received in return. This 
4Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent, p. 230. 
5oibb and Bowen, p. 25. 
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irregular payment of tribute also allowed the Pasalik to 
maintain its recruiting agents in Anatolia. 6 Even this 
financial arrangement did not long continue. Indeed, money 
was only sent to Istanbul when the Ocai wanted to .obtain a 
favor.7 
This loose relationship was convenient for the Turks 
during Suleyman•s reign. Barbarossa and the Ru 1 asa who 
succeeded him as leaders of the Ottoman fleet netted great 
financial advantage as long as they were in the Turkish navy. 
Their first loyalty, therefore, was to the Empire and not to 
the city in which most of them first began as pirates. The 
Algerians, on the other hand, respected these captains, since 
the city was a center for pirates, and most of th~se captains 
had spent their early careers sailing out of Algiers. The 
corsairs• success with the Turkish fleet brought both wealth 
and prestige to Algiers. This led to the development of a 
chain of comm.and in which the Ru 1 asa were a middle link 
between Istanbul and Algiers. The Magribi city felt some 
loyalty to these corsair captains who in turn served the 
Sultan. During the few periods when Algiers responded to the 
Porte's wishes, it was because these requests were made by a 
prominent corsair. The best example of the role of the 
Ru 1 asa in the Ottoman administration of Algeria in the 
6william Shaler, Sketches of Algiers (Boston: 
Cummings, Hilliard and Company, 1826), p. 18. 
7Filippo Pananti, Narrative of a Residence in Algiers, 
trans. Edward Blaquiere (London: Printed for Henry Colburn, 
1818), p. 107. 
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sixteenth century occurred in 1582. In that year ~aptan 
Pasa Ochialy controlled Ottoman affairs in North Africa. He 
_..a,_ 
directed the activities of the Magribi corsairs who acted 
independently of the Turkish navy and had great influence in 
the selection of the beylerbeyis sent to govern Algiers. Any 
political tie between Algiers and Istanbul in this period was 
due solely to Ochialy's position in the Ottoman government. 8 
Several prominent corsairs served in a dual capacity 
as admirals or captains in the Ottoman fleet and as either 
beylerbeyi or some other political position in Algiers.9 But 
even the power and prestige of the Re'is beylerb~yis was 
insufficient to tighten the bond between Algiers and Istanbul. 
An Italian observer commented as follows on the 1550'~: 
••• when, upon any occasion they [beylerbeyis] 
became too intolerable at Algiers, the janizaries 
sent deputations to Constantinople, for the double 
purpose of complaint and solicitation to have another 
appointed in their place.10 
Then, soon after the crushing defeat at Lepanto, the 
' . 
Turks lost both their naval supremacy in the Mediterranean 
and the force which tied Algeria to the Empire. The great 
distance between Algiers and Istanbul could no longer be 
11 overcome. Without their powerful navy the Ottomans could 
8Great Britain, Public R~cords 
State Pa ers Rein of Elizabeth 1 
See also: CSP Rein of Elizabeth 1 
93. Kramers, 11 0chialy, '1 Encyc1·opaedia of Islam, ed. 
M. Th. Houtsma et al. (4 vols; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-
1936), III, 970. 
lOpananti, p. 107. 
11Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent. 
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not exercise any authority over their Magribi Pasa11k. The 
history of the Regency from the 1571 battle until 1830 was 
partially concerned with the working out of a constitutional 
relationship between Istanbul and Algiers that matched the 
actual political position of the Pas~lik in the Ottoman 
Empire. Algiers ' legal status went through two centuries of 
evolution before it corresponded to the political realities 
that should have been apparent to the Porte aft~r 1571. 
These various changes fit into distinct periods of Algerian 
history. 
Between 1518 and 1587, a beylerbeyi appointed by the 
Porte ruled all Ottoman territory in the Magrib. The Turkish 
Empire in North Africa was significantly enlarged during this 
period. In 1551, Sinan ~ captured Tripoli from the Knights 
of Malta, 12 and in 1555, Sal1h Re'is took Bicaya from the 
Spanish. 13 Finally, in 1573, Sinan further diminished the 
Spanish Empire in the Magrib when he defeated the Spanish 
puppet in Tunis and added that city to the Ottoman Empire. 
Simultaneously, the corsair-led· Turkish navy demonstrated its 
strength when it defeated a Christian navy composed of ships 
from most Southern European states in a battle off the island 
of Cerba in 1561. The Turkish navy's influencq in North 
African politics was then demonstrated when the Porte made 
12F. Lopez de Gomara, Annals of the Emperor Charles V, 
trans. Roger B. Merriman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1912), p. 145. 
13Leo Africanus, II, 745. 
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Torgud Pa~a of Tripoli and Sinan Pa~a of Tunis. Both Pasas 
were theoretically subordinate to the beylerbeyi in Algiers, 
and both adopted the administrative system used in that city. 
All three Magribi cities were governed by a Divan composed 
of leading civil, religious and military officials, which 
served in an advisory capacity to the executive appointed by 
the Porte. 14 
Within Magrib al-Awsat, the beylerbeyis concernP,d 
themselves with expanding the province's boundaries and 
maintaining order among the tribes. The size of the Pa~alik 
increased after a series of wars with the Sarifian dynasty , 
of Fez. 15 At the same time Algiers conducted campaigns 
against the tribes in the interior. During the 1560s, Ottoman 
Algeria reached its maximum size.16 
The military frequently rejected these beylerbeyis, 
although some of the governors, notably the corsairs already 
mentioned, were able to rule in peace. The Pa~alik had 
however, achieved enough independence by the end of Suleyman's 
reign to negotiate its own treaties. 17 
In 1583, the English complained that Algiers refused 
to heed the Porte's command that the city cease its attacks 
14Alexander M. Broadley, The Last Punic War: Tunis 
Past and Present (2 vols; London: Blackwood and Sons, 1822), 
I, 48. 
15Lane-Poole, p. 185; Kremers, III, 970. 
l6p1ayfalr, p. 26. 
17Emil Lengyel, Turkey (New York: Random House, 
1941), p. 265. 
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on English shipping. 18 The Porte, without its powerful navy, 
was incapable of controlling the pirate activities of the 
province. This was because Algeria and her rulers grew 
wealthy from the spoils. The Pa9alik disregarded the Sultan's 
frequent commands to stop the raids conducted against the 
Ottoman Empire 's European allies. By 1586, the beylerbeyis 
were unable to put the Sultan•s commands into effect and 
their authority was so negligible that Laurence Aldersey 
observed from Algiers that, n ••• the King [ beylerbeyi], 
doth onely beare the name of a King, but the greatest govern-
ment ls in the hands of the soldiers. nl9 
The Porte attempted to reassert some measure of 
authority when it replaced the beylerbeyi at Algiers with a 
Pasa in 1587. This Pasa was equal in rank to his ~ounter-
---L- --L-
parts who already sat at Tunis and Tripoli and was chosen 
for a three year term from the ranks of the trained admini-
strators in Istanbu1. 20 The Porte believed these trained 
Pasas would be better equipped to rule Algeria than the 
beylerbeyl who were frequently renegade corsairs. The 
Ottoman Empire failed in this attempt to deal with the inde-
pendent ideas and actions of the rebellious Janissaries. 
The Sultan had made an unfortunate change, for although 
Pa~as were intended to be chosen from trained Kapi Kul the 
l8p1ayfair. 
19Hakluyt, III, 358. 
20colombe, I, 368. 
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Pasalik immediately became caught up in the corrupt practices 
of the Ottoman Empire, and the office of Pa9a often went 
instead to the highest bidder. 21 These wealthy governors 
were as ineffective as their predecessors, for the Janissaries 
who dominated the political situation in Algiers could exert 
pressure on the Porte to remove an unpopular Paia from office. 
''Once the complaints of the soldiery were listened to, the 
future chiefs named by the Porte were little more than 
ambassadors. 1122 In sum, when the Porte replaced the beyler ... 
beyis, the era of corsair rule ended, but although authority 
had nominally passed into the hands of the Turkish Pa~a, it 
actually belonged to the Algerian Janissaries. 
The growth of the Janissaries• power continued to 
compromise the position of the Pa~a until the office was 
finally combined with that of the Dey in 1710. But before 
it officially recognized the political status of the Janis ... 
saries, the Porte took the Pa~alik through several steps. 
Meanwhile, the Janissaries limited the Pa§a's powers to such 
an extent that the governors contented themselves with getting 
rich on their share of the corsair's booty. They became so 
obsessed with wealth that they seldom took the time to try 
and punish the Janissaries for ignoring the Porte's commands. 23 
21tane-Poole. 
22pananti. 
23Jean Blottiere, L1Algerie (Paris: Societe d•Editions 




In 1618, the Porte allowed the Janissaries in Algiers 
to nominate their own Paia• By this act, the Algerians then 
gained al.most complete independence even though the Sultan 
reserved the right to confirm the Oca~•s choice.24 And by 
the beginning of Murad III's reign in 1623, the three barbary 
states were overtly rejecting the Sultan's firmans, for the 
Magribis had no intention of heeding the Sultan's wishes in 
any matter that was not in their interest. 25 
Algeria's attitude towards Anglo-Turkish amity 
reflected the Sultan's lack of power in the Paialik. Sir 
Thomas Roe, England's ambassador at Istanbul, wrote in 1624: 
11 The Pirates of Algiers and Tunis have cast off all obedience 
to his [the Sultan's] empire not only upon the sea where they 
are master, but presuming to do many insolences even upon 
the land • . . 1126 Roe convinced the Sultan to recall the 
Paia from Algiers in 1622 when the province defied the 
Porte 1 s command to stop raids on English vessels. This had 
no effect on the corsairs, whose activities neither England 
nor the Ottoman Empire were able to restrain. 27 
England also became concerned over the safety of her 
Consuls at Algiers, and wanted the capitulations negotiated 
24p1ayfair, p. 7. 
25stanley Lane-Poole, The Storv of Turkey (New York: 
o. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888), p. 217. 
26Thomas Roe, Letters, pp. 241-43. From: A. C. Wood, 
The Histor~ of the Levant Company (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 193 ), p. 16n. 
27aeorge J. Eversley, The Turkish Empire 1288-1914 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1923), p. 158. 
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with the Porte enforced in the Magrib. The Algerians refused 
to heed the Sultan's treaty commitments, and a judicial 
arrangement had to be directly negotiated between London and 
Algiers in 1623. 
Algerian administration under the Pagas was highly 
incompetent. The Pa1as, unable to maintain order in t~e 
province, and incapable of subordinating the Janissaries to 
Ottoman control, exercised little authority. In fact, during 
this period the Ocay: increased its political power. The 
administrative situation, however, deteriorated because of 
the conflict between military and executive. This created 
a crisis in 1659 because the government was not effectively 
dealing with the tribal conflicts in the interior. The army 
took this opportunity to further its political position when 
one of the Boluk Ba~is (captains) led a revolt against the 
Pa~a in 1659. The army replaced the Pa~a as head of state 
with the Aga (general) who became the executive in Algiers 
and presided over the Divan of army officers. The Pa~as 
nevertheless continued to come from Istanbul, although they 
could exercise no political power when they arrived. 
During the next twelve years (1659-1671), five Agas 
ruled successively. None succeeded in solving the crisis 
that had led to their appointment, and because of this 
failure the Janissaries murdered each of them. Anarchy 
gripped the interior, but the recalcitrant Janissaries were 
unwilling to give up their independence for the sake of 
administrative harmony. Finally in 1671, the Ta'1fa ul·Ru'asa, 
29 
( corporation of corsair captains) tired of the disorder, 
brought about the most durable change in the ruling insti-
tution. This guild, acting on behalf of the corsairs, brought 
a.b o u t the adoption of a system of government based on the 
o ne that existed in Tunis. A Divan dominated by army officers 
f or life a Dey who had absolute power during his reign.28 
u nable to control the Algerians and convinced by the army 
that the change could financially benefit Istanbul, the 
Porte concurred with the change and therefore issued a firman 
giving legal sanction to the elections. 29 
At the time of the Dey's assumption of power all army 
officers were in the Divan, but this proved to be too 
unwieldy. To strengthen their position, the Deys changed its 
membership; for most of the Deylik period (1671-1830) the 
Divan included the thirty principal Janissary officers plus 
the Mufti, the~' and the Grand-Marabit (ascetic or monk 
who headed a derwi~ order). The first few Deys consulted 
the Divan on all important matters. As time passed, however, 
the executive began to assume more and more power with the 
Dey and his Council of Ministers eventually operating the 
g overnment alone. The only limitation on the power of the 
Deys was the threat of assassination by the army,30 and, in 
fact, over half of the thirty Deys died because they defied 
28Plantet, p. xxiii. 
29Eugene Hatin, Histoire Pittores ue de L'Al erie 
(Paris: Au Bureau Central de la Publication, l 0 , p. 80. 
30rbid., p. 81. 
,, 
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the Ocaf I s wishes. 
During the first forty years of the Dey's rule, the 
Pa~as attempted to obtain political power, and reassert the 
authority of the Ottoman Empire. To this end, they tried 
to meddle in affairs of state and frequently plotted against 
the Deya. This was an easy task, for the army was always 
ready to rebel and the Pa~as made use of this situation.31 
••• though the Janissaries were permitted to 
choose their own governor or Dey, who was invested 
with supreme power, yet the Sultan continued to send 
his Pasha, an officer who was supposed to be his 
representative, and to be engaged in looking after 
his tribute and general interest. It was easy to see 
that this separate jurisdiction and ~stablishment of 
an independent power with foreign views and connec-
tions, must prove injurious to the state; and it had 
been productive of a long series of heart-burnings, 
discontents, and intrigues, the Pasha interfering in 
affairs that in no way concerned him, which the 
Janissaries were sure to resent.32 
Baba cAli Dey (1710-1718), seized complete control of 
the government and threw out the plotting Palja. He then 
wrote to the Sultan that the Pa~a had conspired with 
Christians and Arabs against the best interests of the 
Ottoman province. The Dey having sent the appropriate 
bribes with his dispatch, the Sultan responded quickly by 
issuing a firman investing him with the title of Pa~a and 
permanently removing the Turkish official from the city.33 
Thi s act ended the fiction of Ottoman control. From this 
31 l P antet, p. xxiv. 
32Percival B. Lord, Algiers with Notices of the 
Neighbouring States of Barbar~ (2 ·vols.; London: Printed 
for Whitaker and Company, 183.5), I, 35-36. 
33Ibid --· See also Plantet, pp. xxii-xxiii. 
time forward, the Sultan automatically sent a firman of 
confirmation upon the selection of a new Dey. 
31 
Following this, the Porte meddled in Algerian affairs 
only in response to pressures from European powers. The 
Europeans were primarily concerned with terminating piracy 
V in the Magrib and used the Porte to accomplish this end, but 
to no avail. In 1718, the Ottoman Empire agreed in the Treaty 
of Passarowitz to terminate Algerian pirating in the Medi-
terranean, but this proved to be but another of the Sultan's 
many failures in his attempt to regulate the Algerians.34 
Of its own accord, Istanbul also attempted to return Algiers 
to the old system of Pa~a over Dey. The Empire was unable, 
however, to threaten seriously the oligarchy. Between 1710 . 
and 1830, the only representatives of the Sultan who appeared • 
in Algiers were the ~apic1 Ba7i (officers in the Imperial 
household), sent by the Sultan to handle special matters.35 
Despite their political independence, the Pa,alik 
frequently used the Porte for diplomatic protection. In 
1815, the United States tried to force the Dey to sign a 
peace treaty. Algiers procrastinated and claimed that it 
had to obtain the Porte's permission before the Dey could 
sign a treaty.36 Again in 1816, the Algerians avoided 
trouble in this same manner. The Congress of Vienna having 
34Eversley, p. 201. 
35Lord, pp. 36-37. 
36llll£., p. 63. 
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decreed the abolition of the slave trade, Lord Exmouth, an 
English admiral, tried to carry out the wishes of the Congress 
by leading an Anglo-Dutch fleet against Algiers. The Dey, 
attempting to resist this naval pressure, maintained that he 
could not agree to stop capturing Christians and making them 
slaves without the concurrence of the Sultan.37 
In summary, the Ottoman Empire never held political 
power in Algiers. This was as true in 1556, when the Janis-
saries in the city first revolted as it was in 1787 when the 
American Consul at Algiers wrote: 11 The Algerians are in no 
measure depending on the Grand Siegnor. They reverence him 
on account of his being head or protector ·of their religion. 11 38 
By the early eighteenth century the Porte had lost all 
semblance of control over the Magribl Paialik. The evolution 
of Algiers• status within the Empire revealed several charac-
teristics: First, political power was usually held by the 
Ocai. The army chose the executive and influenced his 
policies. Second, the Algerian Divan, unlike its counterpart 
in other Pa~aliks, emerged as a quasi-legislative body. The 
Divan, composed primarily of army officers, became the domi-
nate factor in the Pa9alik 1 s government. Third, the various 
constitutional changes did not alter the basic administrative 
structure. The bureaucracy apparently functioned almost 
without a change between 1556 and 1830. 
38u. s., Departmegt of State, Consular Reports: 




THE JANISSARIES AND THE TA'IFA UL-RU 1ASA 
When ijasan Barbarossa succeeded his father as 
beylerbeyi of Algeria, he held that office from 1546-51 and 
from 1557-61. Hayru'd-Din had obtained the office for his 
son, probably hoping to establish his family as the dynastic 
rulers of the Pa9alik. While beylerbeyi~ ~asan incorporated 
the Janissaries with the Levends (men trained in the Ottoman 
navy that were of Greek, Dalmatian, and Albanian origin). 
This joint Turkish army in Algiers was still referred to as 
the Janissary Corps. This combination allowed the Turkish 
soldiers in Algiers to emerge as a military force independent 
of the Porte's control1 and allowed it to exercise indirect 
control over the provincial government following ~asan's 
deposition in 1561. 
Although the army did not assume direct control of 
the administration until the middle of the seventeenth 
century, it was nonetheless the dominant political influence 
in the Pa9alik, especially after 1556. In that year the 
Turkish soldiers murdered the beylerbeyi appointed by the 
Sultan. Again in 1561, the army expressed its independent 
attitude when it sent the governor back to Istanbul in 
1John Foss, A Journal of ·the Captivity and Sufferings 
of J. Foss; Several Years a Prisoner at Algiers (Newbury-
port: Angier March, 1798), p. 103. 
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chains. 2 The army accepted and rejected at will the 
beylerbeyis sent by the Porte. Thus, the .government of 
Algeria passed from the Barbarossa family to the Janissaries 
while both the indigenous population and the Ottoman Empire 
helplessly observed the transition. 
The army emerged as the ruling elite in the Pa,alik 
and embedded itself in the administrative structure of the 
province to such an extent that it is necessary first to 
examine the army in order to understand the civil government. 
This was especially important for the period of direct 
military government, 1659-1671, when the Aga of the Janissary 
Corps assumed direct control of the state. Even after 1671, 
when the Deys replaced the Agas as head of state, the 
Janissaries controlled the government. Each Dey's ability 
to placate the Turkish soldiers determined the length and 
effectiveness of his reign. The Dey accomplished this either 
by bowing to the wishes of the army dominated Divan, or 
periodically bribing the Turkish soldiers. In fact, the 
officers' corps had become the political power in Algiers, 
and neither the Ottoman Empire nor any other force could do 
anything about it. 
The Janissary Corps at Algiers expanded from the two 
thousand men that Suleymin the Magnificent had sent 
Hayru'd-Din in 1518, to an army of approximately six thousand 
Ottoman troops.3 Only these Janissaries, brought yearly from 
2Blottiere, p. 23. 
3Playfair, p. 17. 
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Anatolia, could aspire to reach the top positions in the 
bureaucracy. A Turkish soldier reached high office by moving 
through the ranks of the officer's corps where rank was based 
on length of service in the army. As a result, every soldier 
with ambition and a long life could hope to reach the top.4 
This was particularly true between 1671 and 1830, when any 
Turk born in Anatolia was eligible to be elected Dey. 
The officers' corps was organized on the basis of a 
twelve-thousand-man army, although the Turkish force in 
Algeria was never that large.5 The soldiers with the longest 
service automatically became 9avu~es (literally messengers, 
but in this instance they were comparable to sergeants). 
After six years in this position they were promoted to Boluk 
Ba~i (captain). 6 Between these two ranks were the Wakil 
Harci (intendant), and the Oda Ba~i (lieutenant).? The 
forty eldest Oda Ba~is served as follacks (guards of the 
Divan). 8 Of the eight hundred Boluk Ba~is, twenty-four Yaya 
Ba~is (colonels), were chosen on the basis of length of 
service, and the senior Yaya Ba~i became Kahya Aga, second 
in command of the army. The KahYa A6a always succeeded the 
4Plantet, pp. xvi-xvii. 
5p1ayfair, p. 18. 
6Francis Knight, Re of Seven Years Slaver 
under the Turks of Algiers 2 vols.; London: Thomas 




Aga (general) upon the latter's retirement. The A~a served 
as commander of the Janissaries for two months. He then 
retired and became Musal A~a (pensioner), an official who 
advised the government in emergency situations and ruled on 
matters of legal precedence when experience could help the 
ruling institution make a decision.9 In addition, the Aga 
was one of the permanent members of the Day's Council .of 
State, and served as Minister of War. 10 
All Oda Ba9is, Boluk Ba,is, Yaya Ba,is, the Kahya Aga, 
the Aga, and the Musal Agas were originally members of the 
Divan. This became too unwieldy so the Divan's size was 
reduced to include only the Yaya Bagis, the Kahya Aga, and 
the A~a from the army, plus the Mufti, the ~a~i and the 
Grand-Marabit. 11 As members of the Divan the army officers 
controlled affairs of state. 
This military-dominated ruling hierarchy excluded all 
other groups from its councils. Even the Kul Oglu (Turks 
born in Algiers), were regarded as second-class citizens and 
relegated to the lower ranks in both the army and the civil 
bureaucracy. They were not permitted to sit in the Divan. 
A few of the more fortunate Kul Oglu reached the rank of 
provincial Bey or were named ka'id of one of the rural 
9Ibid., pp. 482-83. 
lONevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 213. 
11Hatin, p. 81. 
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districts, but this was as high as they ever rose. 12 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century there were 
sufficient Kul Oglu in Algiers, to make them a faction large 
enough to challenge the position of the military ruling 
clique. The ~a~ba (the city's fortress), was blown up on 
June 20, 1634, and the government charged the Kul Oglu with 
plotting against the position of the army. The Divan then 
banished the Kul Oglu from the Pagalik without a trial, 
sending them in small groups to Bicaya. The Kul Oglu 
believed they would be brought back to Algiers after a brief 
exile, but the government had other plans. The Divan even-
tually sent the Kul Oglu to Tunis where they became part of 
the army of that city. They then attempted to subvert the 
Tunisian government by encouraging the army to revolt against 
the Beys hoping to join the two Pa~aliks into one province 
under Algerian domination. 13 They failed to achieve their 
objective, however. 
Aside from their function as the ruling oligarchy of 
Algeria, the army was important to the Pa,alik's government 
in the sphere of provincial administration. The Janissaries 
were the only link between the capital at Algiers and the 
three interior provinces of .Titterie, Oran and Constantine. 
The Dey's absolute domination extends four days journey 
from the capital. Beyond that, until you reach 
Biludelgerid, is inhabited by wandering tribes who 
merely pay tribute when the army takes its annual 
------------------------ --- ---
12s haler, p. 30. 
13Knight, p. 467. 
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tour through the country. 14 
Any order that existed in the interior during the three 
hundred years of Ottoman rule, was primarily a result of the 
army's ability to dominate the interior. 
The government only maintained two thousand Turkish 
troops regularly in the capita1. 15 Half of the remaining 
four thousand Janissarieshad an inactive status, and the 
other half were garrisoned in towns throughout the country. 
Their prime function was to create order out of the chaos in 
the interior. This disorder resulted from both the extensive 
tribal rivalries and the tendency of the natives to resist 
any form of government. Another factor complicating the 
situation was that the areas outside the coastal towns had 
never completely submitted to the Turkish government in 
Algiers. Hayru'd-Din had come closer than any other Algerian 
ruler to maintaining a stable relationship with the various 
tribes, but this had been based on a lack of regulation 
rather than on an administration that bound the local leaders 
to the central government. 
The purpose of Turkish regulation was to facilitate 
the collection of taxes. Because the local population 
consistantly resisted these exactions, the soldiers often 
treated the subject peoples harshly. The government 
maintained interior fortresses or military colonies (zumul), 
similar to the Anatolian Yolda9 (interior fortresses and 
14Pananti, p. 108. 








re s t i ng places for travellers), at Bicaya, Bore Lehaou, 
Constantine, Medea, Miliana, Mazuna, Maskara and Tlemsen. 
Using a divide-and-rule policy to cope with tribal conflict 
and resistance, 16 the Turkish garrisons stationed in the 
zumuls rostered already existing rivalries or created· new 
one s . The army played one group of nomads against another, 
and the Pa~alik gained the ultimate advantage. The Janissar-
ies organized the Bequins into two categories of tribes. 
One group or tribes was given tax immunities in return for 
their co-operation in the suppression of the more rebellious 
Re 0 aya (subject) tribes. The government in Algiers fre-
quently broke these agreements and shifted the tribes from 
one category to another. 17 
The government neither demanded nor expected anything 
from the subject population as long as there were no serious 
signs of rebellion and the nomads paid their taxes. The Dey 
farmed out the right to collect these taxes to members of the 
Janissary Corps under the direction of four ka'ids (generals 
or garrisons and district rulers), in the main military 
camps. These ka'ids made fortunes, for the Dey allowed them 
to bleed the Re0 aya tribes of all they could get. They paid 
the Dey in Algiers the tax annually levied and kept the 
remainder. 18 
The government lacked any real concern for the 
16 Playfair, p. 17. 
17colombe, p. 368. 
18i{:n1ght, p. 482. 
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effective subjugation and administration of the area outside 
Algiers, as it was largely preoccupied with deriving full 
benefit from the chief source of wealth--the Mediterranean 
Sea. Whether one accepts the traditional view that Algiers 
was primarily concerned with the money she made from piracy 
and exacting tribute from European nations, or the more 
recent interpretation of Sir Godfrey Fisher, that Algerian 
finance was tied to a commerce that averaged seven million 
pounds sterling each year, there is no doubt that Algiers' 
Turkish rulers looked to the sea for the economic sustenance 
of their regime.19 This meant that the ruling Janissary 
oligarchy depended financially on the success of the corsairs. 
If the pirates had a good season, the city prospered and · the 
Ru'asa were heroes. It was out of necessity then that the 
military ruling class occasionally deferred to the wishes of 
the corsair captains. Algiers' corsair navy had been 
important to the city's political life since Hayru•d-Din's 
era when th.e pirates brought fame and fortune to both the 
Ottoman Empire and the Pa7alik. With this prestige, the 
Ta'ifa ul-Ru'asa could turn in emergency situations from 
their duties as pirates to meddle in affairs of state. 20 
The corsairs were able to exercise political influence 
19All sources previously cited agree that Algiers was 
preoccupied with piracy. For Fisher's thesis, based almost 
entirely on the English archives, see Godfrey Fisher, 
Barbary Legend (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 
pp. 1-16. 
20Augustin Bernard, L'Algerie (Paris: Librairie 
Renouard, 1931), p. 50. 
j, ,, 
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because they we re organized in the Ta' ifa ul-Ru' asa, whic.h 
served as a guild to protect their interests. The Dey 
appointed a Minister of Foreign and Naval Affairs from the 
ruling ~' who served as a member of the Council of State21 
and hel d a seat in the Divan. This minister was to direct 
naval matters although this generally was done by the ta'ifa 
ul-Ru'asa. He was the only naval official who had to be 
Turkish and as a result held a high position in the ruling 
h ierarchy. 22 None of the other naval personnel were members 
of the~- The corsairs were either Turks recruited 
d i r ectly from Anatolia or renegade Christians and the ship 
crews were made up of Arabs and Berbers from the Magrib. 
The Dey attempted to limit the corsair's independence 
a t sea by appointing an Aga Ba~i whosailed with each ship 
to ma.ke sure that each Re'is conducted himself properly and 
to guarantee that accurate records were kept of the prizes 
taken. Despite this attempt at regulation, the captain was 
ab s olute on board ship. 23 
Throughout the history of Ottoman Algeria, the Ta'ifa 
ul-Ru'asa occasionally influenced the ruling military clique. 
I n these political maneuverings, the corsair captains had 
t he support of the renegade army, organized by fiayru'd-Din 
to serve as a military supplement to the Janissaries, who 
21see Chapter IV. 
22p1antet, p. xvii. Plantet refers to the Minister 
of .Marine and "Le commandant du port ••• " as the Wakil 
Kardj 1. 
23Hat1n, pp. 113-14. 
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sailed on pirate expeditions and fought in landing parties. 
It should be noted, however, that the navy never developed 
as a permanent political power in the city. During the 
first hundred years of Ottoman rule the leading corsairs had 
been involved in the Turkish navy and their primary loyalty 
had belonged to the Sultan. After 1571, the Ru'asa were 
generally inferior in caliber to those captains who had 
sailed with Barbarossa. Since the Ottoman fleet was no 
longer attractive to the corsairs, many of them had returned 
to Algiers and to the profitable piracy they knew so well, 
but in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Algerian 
pirate navy entered a stage of permanent decline. This was 
due to the concomitant collapse of Ottoman sea power, England 
and Holland's increased interest in Mediterranean commerce, 
and the lack of competent Ru 1asa to lead the corsair fleets. 
Without sufficient prestige and limited by their itinerant 
lives from engaging in extensive political activities, the 
Ia'ifa ul-Ru'asa failed to develop as the dominant political 
force in the city. Only in periods of crisis when the army 
appeared incapable of maintaining order did the Ta'ifa 
ul-Ru 1asa emerge as a power factor. In the absence of this 
competition, the Janissaries were able to seize the Pa§alik's 
administration and rule as they chose. 
Because the Ru'a§a were always an outside influence 
on the ruling oligarchy, it is difficult to measure the 
extent to which they helped determine the government's 






in figures for the period 1628-34. During those six years 
they captured eight French vessels with cargoes valued at 
4,752,000 livres, plus 1,331 slaves.24 Since the corsairs 
usually were active against the shipping of several European 
states simultaneously, these figures undoubtedly represent 
only a portion of the actual revenues obtained through 
piracy. Because the pirate's success varied depending on 
the date in question, their activities played a considerable 
role in the economic life of the city. Examination of 
William Sha~er's (American Cons~l in Algiers 1806-16), budget 
figures reveal that the income in a given fiscal year depended 
on the success of the pirates. 25 The Ru'asa were also 
responsible for the thousands of Christian slaves residing 
in Algiers. To 11st the number of people involved in any 
way with the corsairs would indicate that a large portion of 
the city's population benefited from what might be referred 
to as Algiers' major industry. As the government and 
individual members of the ruling hierarchy received shares 
of the booty, successful pirate voyages were encouraged. 
It is no wonder then that the Ta'ifa ul-Ru'asa 
exerted considerable influence on the political life of 
Algiers at key moments in the city's history. The corsair 
captains were primarily concerned with their work at sea, 
and only became involved in the government when a crisis 
developed in the Pa9alik. Despite the fact that the 
24Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, p. 234. 
25shaler, pp. 33-35. 
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Janissar i es had direct charge of the ruling hierarchy, it 
must be emphasized that the Ru'asa were often influential in 
determining the destiny of Algiers' ruling institution. 
This influence became apparent in 1671 when the . 
corsair captains, tired of the ineffective administr~tion of 
the Agas, replaced these generals by Deys, elected for life 
by the Divan, to serve as head of the government. For 
eighteen years the Ru'asa maintained control over the 
government and elected the ruler. However, in 1689, the 
officers of the Janissary Corps who sat in control of the 
Divan assumed this function. 26 Again in 1716, the corpora-
tion of corsairs exert~d political influence. The military 
h ierarchy had concluded peace treaties during that year with 
the three primary merchant countries, England, Holland and 
France. The corsairs, seeing the major portion of their 
prey taken from them, forced the Divan to declare war on the 
weakest of the three, Holland, to prevent an economic crisis 
from hitting the pirates. 27 
The reduction in the size of the navy from over thirty 
ships in Barbarossa's era to nine in 1786 had little if any 
effect on the routine of pirate life. The corsairs usually 
sailed three times each year between April and September. 
If each captain captured a vessel, the city considered the 
26George Yver, "Dey, 11 Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. 
M. Th. Houtsma et al. (4 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-
1936 ), I, 953. The Divan was by this time little more than 
a council of military officers. 
27 4 Lord, p. 3. 
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voyage a suc ce ss. 28 
The individual Re 1 is conducted his affairs in a 
businesslike manner. He usually built his own ship although 
the captains frequently went into partnership with specula-
tive Algerian merchants (armadores) for financial reasons. 
Christian slaves provided the labor. The marine contingents 
that sailed with the pirates were made up of volunteer Turks 
or renegades (Levends), the Kul Oglu, and when necessary, 
members of the Janissary Corps. 29 Pirate vessels usually 
belonged to the individual corsair captains or the armadores. 
In 1787, however, the government of the Pa~alik owned one-
third of the fleet; the rest belonging to high government 
officials such as the Hasnaci (Treasurer and Prime Minister), 
the Wakil Harci and the Agj!.30 The Wakil HarQi served as 
captain of the ship belonging to the Dey.31 
The following system of dividing the spoils pertained. 
The government of the Pa9alik received all of the captured 
sh ips and one-eighth of the other booty.32 Half of the 
remainder went to the armadores and the Re 1 is, and the other 
half to the sailors and soldiers of the vessel involved in 
the capture. The principal officers received three shares, 
1786. 
28u.s., Richard 0 1Bryen to Thomas Jefferson, June 6, 
29Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, pp. 220-21. 
30u.s., Richard 0 1Bryen to Secretary of State, 
April 4, 1787. 
31Hatin, p. 113. 
32furchas, VI, 154. 
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gunners and helmsmen two, soldiers and swabbers one, and 
Christian slaves one and one-half to three shares each.33 
The government also benefited from closely regulating the 
harbor. Each ship which sailed in paid forty piastres to 
anchor plus a 12 per cent impost.34 The harbor master paid 
10 per cent to the ruling oligarchy and 2 per cent to the 
Dey. In addition, merchant vessels paid a bribe to the 
port director (Liman Re'is) for permission to leave the 
harbor.35 
The following brief survey of the role of Algeria's 
corsair fleet in the Pa9alik's international relations gives 
another example of the navy's importance in the history of 
Ottoman Algeria. Throughout the Ottoman period, Algeria 
prospered from the booty she acquired from pirate raids 
conducted against the commerce of almost every European 
nation. The various victims of this piracy, England and 
France in particular, made frequent but halfhearted attempts 
to terminate this nuisance. These attempts failed for many 
reasons: first, Algiers was often used as an instrument of 
a particular continental power's foreign policy. A European 
state would pay a high price for peace with Algeria, and the 
Pa~alik was then free to attack the tribute payer's continen-
tal enemies. Second, the naval expeditions sent against 
Algiers were sometimes excuses for displays of sea power. 
33Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, pp. 224-25. 
34Plantet, p. xxi. 
35Hakluyt, III, 122. 
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Third, a European nation would tolerate Algerian belligerence 
to protect a trade agreement with the Pa9ali.k. And fourth, 
to conquer Algeria was almost impossible. No European state 
prior to the nineteenth century was willing to commit the 
requisite sea and land forces necessary to defeat the 
Algerians. 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Algerian 
pirates prospered in a Mediterranean environment that all 
but approved of pirate raids and galley slaves. In the 
eighteenth century the Deys were able to weave a proper 
balance according to the stipulations described above by 
declaring war and making peace with the right power at the 
right time. Algiers became a part of the European balance 
of power. 
The diplomatic changes wrought at the Congresses of 
Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle changed all of this. The result 
of the 1815 and 1819 meetings was a temporary spirit of 
unity among the major European states and a new antislavery, 
antipiracy morality. The rules had been changed by the 
major powers in the world, and the small Ottoman Pa9alik 
with less than one million people was faced with inevitable 
overthrow. The Deys were not able to combat the united 
attitude of Europe for long and her corsair navy's persistent 
raids against these European states was one of the factors 
that brought the French army to Algeria. 
The corsair navy created and helped sustain the 
Algerian province, but it also supplied the French with a 
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, 
l' ,: 
,Ii 
motive to attack the Ottoman Pa~alik. Thus, the Ta'ifa 
ul-Ru'asa played a significant role in the history of 
Ottoman Algeria although political power rested largely in 




The bureaucracy in Algeria functioned as though it 
had no connection with the Janissaries in the ruling hierarchy 
when in fact, many of the functionaries in the province were 
drawn from the ranks of the army corps. Almost as if a power 
struggle did not exist, the Algerian bureaucracy, patterned 
after that of the Ottoman Empire, collected taxes and 
dispensed justice, generally making sure that the day-to-day 
functions of government were performed efficiently. Despite 
the outward appearance of instability indicated by the 
number of Deys assassinated and the rebelliousness of the 
tribes in the interior, this bureaucracy continued to 
operate, almost impervious to the political upheaval which 
often engulfed Algeria. Ottoman Algeria possessed a charac-
teristic uncommon to other areas of the Ottoman Empire. 
While corruption riddled the Empire in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and the administrative system collapsed 
in many provinces, the Algerian bureaucracy maintained its 
form and failed to disintegrate. 
One criteria of administrative efficiency is the 
ability of a state to maintain law and order. If this is 
used to judge Ottoman Algeria, then the Pa9alik's government 
was at least competent. William Shaler wrote as follows in 
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the 1820s: "There ls probably no city in the world, where 
there is a more vigilant police, where fewer cognizable 
crimes are committed, or where there is better security for 
a person and property than in Algiers. 111 The Algerian 
bureaucracy did, in fact, consist of a complex, disciplined 
body of trained officials capable of maintaining this law 
and order. 
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The Dey was chief of state. He declared war, made 
peace, summoned the Divan, levied taxes and tribute, appointed 
all government officials, received the property of any 
official violently removed from office, and was the final 
judge in criminal cases.2 He would have been an absolute 
monarch but f'or the threat of assassination held over his 
head by the army. Originally the Deys consulted the Divan 
on all important matters, but by the nineteenth century this 
body had dwindled to lnsignificance.3 If the Janissaries 
were paid, the Ru 1 asa allowed enough freedom to pirate, and 
the Pa~allk did not suffer a military setback, the Dey 
remained in office.4 Each Dey was appointed by the Divan, 
automatically confirmed by a firman from Istanbul and subject 
to the whims of the army. After that he was absolute. 
Required ceremony tempered this absolutism further. 
ThA Dey was expected to be available each day to receive 
lshaler, p. 52. 
2Pananti, p. 290-91. 
3shaler, p. 16. 












petitions from his subjects. He was not permitted to have 
a seraglio ,5 or to live with his family. He was: ". • • 
a rich man but not master of his riches, a father without 
children, a husband without a wife, a despot without liberty, 
a king of slaves and the slave of his subjects. 116 
Each Dey appointed a Council of Ministers which was 
responsible to the ex·ecutive rather than to the Divan. The 
roost important of these ministers was the Hasnaci (Minister 
of Finance and first minister). Also in the Council were 
the Aga, the Wakil Harc1 (Minister of Marine), the ~ebit 
ul-Maci (.keeper of state property) and the Khodiet al-Kheil 
[sic] (receiver of tribute)'.7 When there was a vacancy, the 
Divan usually elected one of these ministers to serve as the 
Dey. Once the Deys had displaced the Divan, in mid-eighteenth 
century, the Council of .Ministers became only a consultative 
body.8 
An accountant and two Jewish bookkeepers assisted the 
Hasnaci,9 and the ministers were generally served by eighty-
four secretaries (hocas). Four of these hocas held a higher 
rank. One kept the government's accounts, paid the army and 
supervised the payment of expenses. A second recorded all 
imports. The third and fourth respectively accounted for 
5 Foss, p. 73. 
6Yver, "Dey," p. 953. 
7Blottiere, p. 24. 
8shaler, p. 16. 




receipts and recorded the Dey's decrees. 10 The less important 
hocas held minor posts such as .keeping records in specific 
customs houses. 
Aside from these ministers and their secretaries, 
there were several other important executive officials. A 
Kodjia single [sic] disposed of the government's share of the 
pirate booty, and a dragoman who spoke both Arabic and Turkish 
was the Day's official interpreter. 11 In addition there was 
a P1tremelg1 [sic] who registered burials,12 and a Roca de 
Cavallas (Adjutant General). 13 
Algerians who violated the city's criminal law were 
tried by the Dey and punished by the Aga. Civil law, cases 
concerning divorce and inheritance, was ruled on by the ta~1, 14 
who used the ~ur'an as the civil code. There were two ~a9:1s, 
one who tried Tur.ks and another for the subject population •. 
In cases involving a Turk and a Moor, the Turk chose the 
court in which the case would be decided. 15 Each~ was 
assisted by agents who traveled on circuit throughout the 
province. Algiers had a Mufti who approved all new laws in 
his fatwa (pronouncement) and heard appeals from the ~a~i's 
court. The Sultan and the Seyhu'l-Islam appointed the Mufti 
lOpananti, p. 303; Hatin, p. 86. 
llHatin, p. 88. 
12Pananti, p. 304. 
13shaler, p. 17. 
14Hatin, p. 92. 
15shaler, p. 22. 
for Algiers. This Mufti in turn consulted with the Sultan 
and they selected Algiers' ~a~is from one of the religious 
schools in Istanbul or Cairo.16 
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If the Dey wanted to circumvent the decisions of the 
Mufti or the lli.!,, he consulted the cu1ema (orthodox religious 
leaders). This practice became prevalent in periods when 
the ~a9is were bribed and the Dey wanted an honest and inex-
pensive decision. 17 By the end of the eighteenth century 
disputes involving foreigners were settled either by the 
Consu118 of the accused foreigner or by an assembly of all 
Consuls in Algiers. 19 
The Turks in Algiers had a privileged status in the 
courts. No matter how serious the crime, a Turk usually 
received no worse than the bastinado (lashes across the soles 
of the feet). 20 Wh~n a Turk committed treason or another 
serious crime he was led out of the city and privately 
strangled. The most serious crime a non-Muslim could commit 
was to speak out against Islam. Laws were harsh for subject 
population and convicted persons, Muslim, Christian or Jew, 
were frequently beheaded or mutilated as punishment for a 
minor crime. The Pa9alik's legal attitude was that it was 






better to punish the innocent than to allow the guilty to go 
free. 21 Algerians who committed lesser crimes were either 
bastinadoed or locked up in the city's bagnio (prison). 
The Dey had twelve servants called 9avu~es who served · 
as his personal police. There was a group for both the Moors 
and the Turks in the city. The 1avu~es were never armed and 
their function was to arrest Turks and Moors accused by the 
Dey. To resist a 9avuy was punishable by death. 22 
Magrib al-Awsat was administratively divided into 
four areas. There were t~ee provinces: Oran in the west 
with its capital at Maskara until 1792, and then the city 
of Oran; Constantine in the east with its capital in 
Constantine; and Titterie in the center of Algeria with Medea 
as its capitai. 23 The fourth area was the city of Algiers 
which was governed independently of the three provinces. 
A Bey (governor) appointed by the Dey for a three 
term governed each province. 24 The Beys all had a complement 
of Janissaries under their command which they used to keep 
the peace among the tribes in the province. These Beys and 
the army kept the tribes loosely tied to the government and 
only harassed them when collecting taxes. The government 
allowed each tribe to elect its own ~ey~ who was responsible 
2lshaler, pp. 20-21. 
22pananti, pp. 213-13. 
23Bernard, p. 52. 
24Foss, p. 79. 
to the Dey for the tribes' payment of taxes and its general 
conduct. 25 
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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the nomads 
began to wander out of Algeria. They either went to Tunis 
or further south in the Sahara. Those who went to Tunis 
frequently plotted with the governor (Bey) of that Paialik 
against the Dey in Algiers. This movement was a reaction 
against the harshness and oppression of the tax collectors. 
The government settled those nomads that remained in specific 
districts and allowed them to elect their own Emirs and 
council of elders. 26 
The presence of the Janissaries in the various towns 
in addition to their policy of playing upon tribal differences, 
kept most of the tribes peaceful. Only the Kabyles (a group 
of Berbers in the mountains between Algiers and Oran) were 
never completely subdued. It was widely believed in the 
early nineteenth century that if the Kabyles and semi-
tributary tribes were to unite and simultaneously rebel, the 
Turks could have been easily defeated. But the nomads never 
had the wisdom to unite to free themselves from Ottoman rule. 27 
The Dey in Algiers never bothered the provincial Beys 
so long as the requisite tax was sent to the capital. After 
the Bey performed this task for his master, he was absolute 
in his province. Aside from his Janissary contingent, the 
25shaler, pp. 85-88. 
26Knight, p. 486. 
27shaler. 
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Bey was assisted by a halif (intendant) appointed by the 
Dey, 28 and a courier (wakil-i sipanhiyan [sic)). 29 The Bey 
also chose ka'ids to govern each of the towns in his prov-
ince.JO The main function that these civil officials performed 
was to send Algiers the tax levied annually on each town.31 
The Beys used tyranny and oppression to maintain 
themselves in their jobs, for the Dey would have regarded a 
mild ruler to be an ambitious man who was trying to become 
popular with the subject population and thus harmful to the 
central government. The Dey required each Bey to appear in 
Algiers to give an account of his rule at least once every 
three years when his term ended. At this time the Dey would 
decide on whether the Bey would be reappointed. When they 
made their triennial appearance before the Dey they would 
generally make a ceremonial entrance to his palace and 
lavish great sums of money upon various officials, including 
even the Dey himself and his Council of Ministers. In the 
nineteenth century it is reported that the~ of Oran and 
Constantine paid as much as 300,000 dollars for this 
purpose.32 
The city of Algiers, capital of the Pa~alik, had an 
28Pananti, p. 311. 
29colombe, p. 368. 
30Pananti. 
31Kn1ght, p. 484. Knight gives figures for the taxes 
l evied on the various towns in the 1620s. 
32shaler, pp. 19-20. 
! . 
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independent status and was usually regarded as the Dey•s 
personal province. The feyh el-Beled was the civil governor 
of Algiers and a Kigya commanded the city's militia. An Aga 
de Kul was superintendent of police and the Mezouard taxed 
and controlled the houses of prostitution. All of these 
officials were appointed by the Dey.33 
Algiers was divided into quarters in which the 
inhabitants lived according to their occupation. The Ru•asa 
generally resided in large houses along the harbor. Artisans, 
organized in guilds that were led by powerful Emins, (leaders) 
usually lived in the same section of the city as the other 
members of their guild • .34 
The bulk of the city's population was composed of Arab 
and Berber tribes (Bani-Maza•ab was the principal tribe in 
the Paialik) and Jewish artisans and merchants. Each ethnic 
group chose its own Emin who was responsible to the govern-
ment for the group's conduct. The Jews in Algiers were 
severely oppressed. Although they were free to operate as 
businessmen and bankers, they suffered many disadvantages. 
Jews paid an annual poll tax to the Dey and were subject to 
the same customs regulations as foreigners. Jews in Algiers 
also had to wear distinguishing dress, usually a black robe.35 
33shaler, p. 52. Pananti says the Mezouar was Lord 
Mayor. Pananti, p. 303. 
34shaler. 
35Pananti, p. 159. 
58 
Despite these disadvantages, Jews were frequently 
chosen to serve in the government. They were also allowed 
to buy tax farms, own banks, and assume a leading role in 
Algerian commerce. By 1805, they had such a financial hold 
on the city that they became an important faction in the 
government. This angered the Janissaries who shot the 
Jewish li,asna9i, Busnah, in June, 1805.36 In the late 1820s 
the Jewish banking houses, concerned over the lack of order 
in the interior and their own position in the city, began to 
pressure France to intervene and establish a French colony 
in Algeria. This connection between the Jewish bankers and 
France may have contributed to the French decision to invade 
Algeria in 1830. 
In 1830, the government of Algeria possessed an 
administration system that had functioned adequately for 
over three hundred years; it had an army and navy that gave 
the country some semblance of law and order; and, finally 
it was economically solvent. Although Algiers' budget for 
1830 ran a deficit, the Pa9alik had a treasury balance of 
ten million dollars.38 
36Playfair, pp. 116, 235. 
37Blottiere, p. 25. See also, Jane S. Nickerson, 
A Short Hisgory of North AfriQf (New York: Devon-Adair, 
1961), p. 9. 
38shaler, pp. 32-33. 
CHAPTER V 
EPILOGUE--THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF ALGERIA 
Unlike the situation in Tunis in 1881 and Egypt in 
1882 , the French occupied Algeria for reasons unrelated to 
conditions in the country or the position of the foreigners 
t here. The July monarchy of Charles X was in its last days, 
and the French Prime Minister Polignac looked across the 
Mediterranean to Ottoman Algeria for a means of bolstering 
h is unpopular King's throne. Polignac had long aspired to 
establish a French Empire for the restored Bourbons. He at 
f irst had wanted to expand France's northern borders to the 
Rhi ne River, but this was blocked by France's European 
rivals. As a result, the French minister plotted against 
t he extremely vulnerable position, of the Dey in Algiers. 
Nineteenth century Europe viewed Algiers with a dis-
approving eye. The post-Napoleonic era had developed a mor-
a l i stic brand of diplomacy that would have disavowed the 
machinations of a Talleyrand as it disapproved of the slavery 
and piracy that sustained Algeria. Europe's new morality, the 
amity that existed among the Concert powers, and his own thirst 
for a Bourbon Empire, motivated Polignac to attack Algiers. 
When the Dey, insulted by the French Consul, responded 
by h itting the French official with a fly swatter, France 
demanded an apology, the termination of Algerian piracy, and 
59 
60 
the payment of an indemnity. The Dey believed that Algeria 
would be able to ward off this threat as it had those in 
the past and refused to concede on any point. This refusal 
gave Polignac the opportunity he had been seeking. A French 
expedition was sent against the recalcitrant Algerian ruler 
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